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CHINA'S CASE AT PARIS

By the Editor

THERE are a few great problems that the Peace Conference must solve if the affairs of nations are to be settled in a sense preventing or minimizing the chances of war in the future.

Not the least vital of these problems is the group of issues known generally as the Far Eastern Question and more specifically as the Chinese Question. When an investigator sets out to find out just what that problem is, as viewed by the Chinese leaders here in Paris, he is told that it centers "on the maintenance of the independence and integrity of China, which has been guaranteed in a series of conventions and agreements concluded severally by Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States with Japan," and that the necessity of these international guarantees "springs from the inability of China to prevent assaults on her sovereignty owing largely to the weakness marking the transition of a state in the throes of re-adjusting its life to the demands of a new environment."

Obviously then, to survive as an independent nation, "China must succeed in adapting her life to the new environment created by foreign pressure and intercourse. She has been trying to do so; and not improbably she might have made greater progress in this direction if, like Japan, she had been a poor country with little to tempt the appetite of alien imperialism."

THE MEANING OF KIAOCHOW

"Therefore," say the Chinese delegates, "the solution of the Chinese Question involves the liberation or release of China from the burdens and conditions imposed on her in the interests of an aggressive imperialism and necessarily in conflict with her freedom to adapt herself to the new conditions of life set up by alien contact and intercourse. Within this category of burdens is included the system of imperialistic rights, interests and privileges which Germany established in the Province of Shantung in 1898, as compensation for the death of two German missionaries who were killed in the Province. This German system is typically expressed in the leased territory of Kiaochow and in the trans-Shantung railway known as the Tsingtao-Chinan Railway, besides in mining and other "rights" in the Province.

Kiaochow consists of a piece of territory around the Kiaochow Bay lying off the Northeastern coast of Shantung. The most valuable section of Kiaochow lies partly in the port of Tsingtao, which Germany developed and fortified and made the terminus of the trans-Shantung Railway, and partly in an area adjoining Tsingtao which Japan, since her reduction of Kiaochow, has developed and delimited for exclusive Japanese occupation. Kiaochow also had a strategic value for Germany, who used it as a point d'appui in connection with her policy of political and economic penetration in Shantung."

THE TRANS-SHANTUNG RAILWAY

Be it said, in passing, that the trans-Shantung Railway runs through the heart of Shantung, connecting the capital of the Province-Chinan or Tsinan with the port

of Tsingtao. The railway dominates the entire Province; and in the event of war, its possession by an enemy would enable the latter not only to over-run Shantung, but also the great province of Chih-li, in which Peking is situated.

JAPAN'S DEMANDS ON CHINA

China also claims that the twenty-one demands which Japan, suddenly and without provocation and in a manner for which there was no precedent in the history of foreign relations with China, presented to China on January 18, 1915, were most formidable. "They were submitted personally under the gravest warning of silence by the Japanese Minister to the President of the Republic. It is within the common knowledge of the foreign chanceries that an incomplete edition of these demands was communicated by the Japanese Government to the other powers, the section most menacing to China being excluded from this communication and its existence even denied. Treaties, declarations, and notes—based on those demands—China was compelled to sign on May 25, 1915, under pressure of a Japanese ultimatum, edged with a threat of war."

"On May 11, 1915, the American Government cabled an identic communication to the Chinese and Japanese Governments, reading, 'In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door Policy. An identical note has been transmitted to the Japanese Government.'"

"British public opinion was also seriously perturbed by Japan's demarche and found its expression in the words of a great public organ that 'a scheme of this kind, if carried through, would put all China under Japanese suzerainty. Of course, it would also imperil extensive British commercial and industrial interests in China, and it would knock the bottom out of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, which guaranteed the integrity of China and equality of opportunity to all Powers.'"

CHINA PREVENTED FROM INTERVENING

But, why has not China done more for the Allies? China answers: "In August, 1914, the Chinese Government expressed to the Allies their desire to declare war against Germany and to take part in the Anglo-Japanese operations against the German garrison in Tsingtao. The proposal was not pressed owing to the intimation reaching the Chinese Government that the proposed Chinese participation was likely to create 'complications' with a certain power. Again in November, 1915, it is an open secret that the Chinese Government was prepared to enter the war in association with the Allies, but the Japanese Government refused their assent to

this help being given. As you all know the Chinese Government sent a warning note to Germany on February 9, 1917, severed diplomatic relations with Germany on March 14, and declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary on August 14, 1917."

"In this connection it is of historical interest to make the following quotation from a dispatch written by M. Krupensky, the Russian Ambassador at Tokio, to his home Government, under date of February 8, 1917; 'I never omit an opportunity for representing to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the desirability, in the interests of Japan herself, of China's intervention in the war, and only last week I had a conversation with him on the subject. Today I again pointed out to him that the present moment was particularly favorable, in view of the position taken by the United States, and the proposal made by them to the Neutral Powers to follow their example. . . . On the other hand the Minister pointed out the necessity for him, in view of the attitude of the Japanese public opinion on the subject, as well as with a view to safeguard Japan's position at the future peace conference, if China should be admitted to it, of securing the support of the Allied Powers to the desires of Japan in respect of Shantung and the Pacific Islands. These desires are for the succession to all the rights and privileges hitherto possessed by Germany in the Shantung Province, and for the acquisition of the Islands to the north of the equator now occupied by the Japanese. Motono plainly told me that the Japanese Government would like to receive at once the promise of the Imperial (Russian) Government to support the above desires of Japan.'"

OFFER OF MAN-POWER TO THE ALLIES

China also emphasizes the fact that "a large contingent of Chinese workmen labored for the Allies behind the battle lines in Northern France. They eventually numbered 130,678. Not a few of them were either killed or wounded by enemy operations. In addition to these workers in France, a large number were employed in connection with the British operations in both Mesopotamia and German East Africa, and the crews of quite a considerable number of British ships were manned by Chinese sailors. Besides placing at the disposal of the Allied Governments nine steamers, which were greatly needed for the Chinese export trade, the Chinese Government offered to dispatch an army of 100,000 to reinforce the man-power of the Allied and the Associated States in France. The offer was favorably entertained by the Inter-Allied Council at Paris, and the French Government instructed their diplomatic representative in Washington to approach the American Government on the subject of arranging for the necessary tonnage for the transport of the men. Owing to lack of shipping facilities, the proposal eventually failed to materialize."

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Naturally China views the establishment of a League of Nations as a vital interest of a high order. She believes that it will "be a supreme expression of the intellectual and moral qualities of the modern mind; and that it will be assessed by history as the biggest achievement, not of today, but of all times." She thinks that

for Far Asia, "it will mean the continued independent existence of a nation with a continued life of myriad years, a nation long before modern Europe arose out of the ruins of old Rome, whose founders of great creeds taught them when tribal Europe was sacrificing to strange unknown gods."

"UNMANIFEST DESTINY"

By WILLIAM J. TUCKER

Ex-President of Dartmouth College.*

WHAT of our attitude to the nation, the object of our immediate and urgent concern? Can we do better than try to apply this injunction that we keep the faith in the sense in which I have tried to interpret it—as the power to adjust our minds to great issues as they arise? How constant and imperative has been the demand for the use of this power in our recent history. To recur to Richard Hovey's figure—with what rapidity have we been forced out of the region of our "manifest" unto that of our "unmanifest destiny."

For a century we lived in the security and pride of our isolation. That was our providential assignment among the nations. That was our "manifest destiny." It took but so slight a cause as the Spanish War to disabuse our minds of that fallacy and adjust us to our place in the world.

Then came our experience of neutrality. That, we tried to persuade ourselves as we shrank from the horrors of war, was our "manifest destiny." Upon the high authority of our President we were assured for a time that this was to be our distinction. "We are," he said, "a mediating nation—the mediating nation of the world." This was a fit conception as applied to our internal life, that of mediating among the races and peoples of which we are "compounded," but as a theory of our relation to the warring nations it soon became unsatisfying, then disheartening, and then a burden intolerable to bear, an experience too bitter to endure. The day when we disowned our neutrality was a day of emancipation. And today the joy with which we welcome our returning sons is in part the expression of our gratitude for our deliverance at their hands from our abject condition into the community of the suffering but exalted nations.

And now we are entering upon another stage in the disclosure of our "unmanifest destiny." What part shall the nation take in the use of its sovereignty? Certainly this is a great issue, in the minds of many a very grave issue. But it is here, and how shall we meet it? I can only answer for myself. I cannot allow myself to believe that we shall put such a construction upon the doctrine of sovereignty as will block the way in the further advance toward the realization of our "unmanifest destiny." I believe rather that "we the people" will allow, and if need be charge, the nation in the full exercise of its sovereignty to keep company with the great sovereignties of the world in the positive and determined effort to maintain the rule of justice, order, and peace. If a fellowship with this intent is to exist and we are

*From letter to alumni of the college.